From roses to bullets: the rise and decline of

post-Soviet colour revolutions by Ó Beacháin, Donnacha & Polese, Abel
1From roses to bullets: the rise and decline of 
post-Soviet colour revolutions
Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese
Donnacha Ó Beacháin is Lecturer and Marie Curie Fellow at the School of Law and 
Government, Dublin City University
Abel Polese is Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh 
From the book: Uwe Backes, Tytus Jaskulowski, and Abel Polese
(eds.) Totalitarianism and Transformation: Central and Eastern Europe between 
Socialist Legacy and Democratic Transformation (Totalitarismus und Transformation 
Defizite der Demokratiekonsolidierung in Mittel- und Osteuropa) (Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2009) pp. 63-100.
2Civic and political actions aimed at achieving political change and removing 
unpopular presidents occurred in several post-communist states between 1998 and 
2006 would seem to have many elements in common. All regime changes were 
attempted using non-violent protest methods and a political opposition, assisted by a 
vibrant civil society, popular support, and Western aid succeeded in either replacing 
or, at least, challenging a political monopoly. In some cases, these “colour 
revolutions” have produced significant changes, notably in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia, 
and Ukraine; in other cases change has been less visible but has nonetheless affected 
society and revitalized the political opposition as in Belarus and Azerbaijan  or, to a 
lesser extent, in  Russia or Kazakhstan. Little has changed, however, in countries like 
Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. 
While it would be wrong to assume that the phenomenon is limited to post-
socialist countries – similar events have occurred elsewhere as in Nepal 2006 and 
Myanmar 2007 – the very nature of post-communist countries, whose political and 
economic structures were similar at the end of the cold war, provides good grounds 
for comparative analyses. Of particular interest is the momentum that colour 
revolutions gained between the end of 2004 and the first half of 2005, when 
expectations had risen to such an extent that every election in CIS countries seemed 
susceptible to triggering a revolution, at least until the Uzbek authorities showed that 
use of non-violent strategies would not necessarily be matched with a similar attitude 
by the elites and the price for miscalculating government responses was life itself. 
Since the Andijan massacre of May 2005, when hundreds of protesting Uzbeks were 
shot dead, coloured protests became since ever more cautious but the strategy was not 
phased out as the 2006 protests in Minsk demonstrate. However, it lost some of the 
force and impetus that made it a modular phenomenon able to build a revolution on 
3the mere expectations of political actors.1 The starting question of our research is: 
why were some protesters, as in Georgia, able to take power brandishing roses while 
others, as in Uzbekistan, were subdued by brute force.
In particular, we are interested in the reasons for the colour revolutions’ 
popularity and success. The speed with which the phenomenon spread was surprising 
and it now seems that there has been a convergence of techniques used by both post-
soviet governments and oppositions. Despite the lost momentum after Andijan similar 
techniques have been used in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia between 2007 and 
2008.2
By comparing the way these revolutions were attempted or executed 
throughout the post-soviet space this article attempts to address the questions above. 
To do so we have chosen to concentrate on the whole of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) for a number of reasons. First of all, being all successors of 
the Soviet Union the similarities between those countries are most evident. Second, it 
is unclear when the colour revolutions started so that a choice, more or less arbitrary, 
is necessary so that – and this is the third point – we chose to concentrate on those 
countries that our field experience allow us to analyse to a deeper extent. The article 
starts with an overview of the colour movement from the first stirrings to the present 
day. We then propose criteria that will be applied to our analysis, constructed on five 
variables. The factual analysis of individual countries that follows is built around 
these five variables.
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2 Since 2005, the emphasis on civil society has also motivated ruling elites to manufacture pro-
government movements and organisations to counterbalance those of the opposition. We are aware that 
the colour revolutions phenomenon is an ongoing process, which is why we have adopted a 
circumscribed time frame and concentrate on the 2003-2006 period for comparative analysis.
4I. The alpha and omega of colour revolutions
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, non-violent protest became 
increasingly common in communist Eastern Europe culminating with the emergence 
of Solidarność in 1981. Millions forced the Polish government to renegotiate work 
conditions, providing ample evidence of how strong and successful non-violent 
protest could be. By the end of the decade, non-violent “revolutions” were 
experienced on a major scale. Primary examples include the Czechoslovak “Velvet 
Revolution” and East German “Friendly Revolution” while in the USSR a human 
chain of two million people stretching from Vilnius to Tallinn held hands to 
symbolise their determination to achieve independence for the Baltic Republics 
(1989). Although sometimes, as in Tbilisi (1989) and Vilnius (1991), the authorities 
killed protesters, the demonstrators largely stuck with their strategy of peaceful 
collective action. This movement of people power has not been limited to Eastern 
Europe. The Philippines, South Korea, Pakistan, Burma, China and several other 
countries have seen the rise of non-violent protest movements, though the outcome 
has not always been idyllic.3
In the course of the 1990s, non-violent protest movements came to be 
perfected. The Slovak elections of 1998 are considered a major turning point when 
opposition parties, civil society and the population jointly challenged the legitimacy 
of Prime Minister Mečiar and, through voter education and promoting a high electoral 
turnout, engineered a victory for the opposition.4 Two years later, Belgrade was the 
theatre of a similar movement though unlike the case in Slovakia, the Serbian 
government refused to acknowledge the election results. It followed that for the first 
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5time in the post-communist space, street protests were used to de-legitimate the ruling 
elites and force a president, in this case Slobodan Miloševic, to resign. The defining
moment of the campaign was the occupation of the parliament by ordinary people in 
what has been called the “Bulldozer revolution”. What had been considered isolated 
episodes in Slovakia and Serbia came to have a more widespread significance in the 
following years. Revolutions passed from being a sporadic event to a constant worry 
for political elites facing elections5 and an attempt to effect a colour revolution was 
witnessed, during 2003-2006, in most former soviet republics. 
There are a number of reasons why the phenomenon was witnessed on such a 
scale in the former communist space. One perspective might be that the former 
communist countries were a primary target because of their geopolitical importance 
and it was easier to build on the structures created during the Cold War, when large 
sections of the US intelligence resources were devoted to the region. From another 
point of view, income distribution had become more uneven, despite economic 
growth, and fomented discontent that could be channelled into bitterness against 
rigged election results. When evidence of election falsification could be produced, the 
elections proved to be a defining emotional moment, a collective slap in the face that 
prompted civil protests. Civil society mobilised and cultural and linguistic similarities 
could help a diffusion of information and exchange of know how. In addition, some 
of the countries could be classified as “post-totalitarian”6 with the political elites 
losing support at both the domestic and international level, which in turn narrowed the 
tools they could use to manage the state. This did not happen to the same extent 
                                                                                                                                      
4 Bunce/Wolchik, Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions. In: Journal of Democracy, 17 
(2006) 4, pp. 5-18.
5 In this respect Tucker has maintained that elections, and in particular rigged elections, are a climax of 
emotional involvement and it is easy to mobilize people; see Tucker, Enough! In: Perspectives on 
Politics, 5 (2007) 3, pp. 537-553.
6 Linz/Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
6everywhere and to compare the different outputs of similar movements and strategies, 
from Georgia 2003 to Belarus 2006, we believe it is useful to organize the analysis 
along five major variables and show how each relevant country interacts with these 
five variables. 
The first variable relates to the character of the state on the eve of the protests. 
Much depends on the attitude of elites and their commitment to democracy. None of 
the twelve countries analysed here was classifiable as a democracy before the events7
but it is undeniable that some presented more democratic tendencies than others in 
terms of freedom of expression, impartiality and independence of media, repressive 
potential and attitude to political pluralism. Relatively democratic oriented elites are 
more likely to allow the preconditions for a colour revolution to take root by 
permitting the development of civil society, the opposition more freedom to 
organize,8 foreign influences in domestic affairs and generally not hindering popular 
political participation. A democratic and permissive attitude might not necessarily 
derive from a genuine desire for democracy but might be dictated by necessity such as 
lack of economic resources that prompts the elite to be more Western friendly in 
exchange for greater financial aid. Alternatively, the elite in power might present 
some signs of fragmentation, given that conflicts for power inject factionalism so that 
“the regime” is far from being monolithic. This can sometimes result in elite 
defections to the opposition during a political crisis or opportunistic bandwagoning as 
power leaks from the incumbent president and flows onto the streets.
The second main variable is the opposition. A compact opposition is a sine 
qua non for a number of reasons. If opposition leaders are engaged in a struggle for 
power against one another they will be unable to challenge pro-presidential elites and 
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7will tend to steal voters from one another rather than the ruling regime. Only when the 
opposition can unite the anti-regime elements in the electorate can they try to 
convince those who are undecided or on whom the regime depends. Furthermore, if 
the opposition itself is fragmented external actors (and the electorate itself) will be 
confused and disheartened by the presence of so many leaders. It is important to 
highlight the conditions in which the opposition operates: the opposition might be 
illegal, with the international community unable to express support without 
positioning itself openly against the regime. The ability to unite is also affected by the 
presence of charismatic leaders able to rouse the population and give concrete shape 
to popular discontent by formulating a coherent and cogent programme of action. 
Finally the strength of the opposition is also measurable through the economic means 
they have at their disposal. If the economic elite is fully backing the government, it 
will be difficult for the opposition to find the means to mount a challenge. 
Although we agree that external influences have been a key element in the 
protests and we use it as a third variable, we consider them of secondary importance. 
It would be wrong to believe that the USA and the EU, by pumping money into a 
country, can by themselves change the destiny of individual post-soviet countries. 
While development aid does give external actors a say, experience demonstrates that 
aid may not reach its targets at the local level but rather may simply end up in an
autocrat’s foreign bank account.9 In addition, external influences are strongly affected 
by a number of factors other than ideological or political. In oil rich countries, for 
instance, the influence of external actors is limited as foreign money is seen only as an 
asset in addition to domestic resources and not as a vital necessity for the local 
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8economy, as is the case of countries that have few natural resources.10 It is important 
to assess the relationship between the elite and foreign forces, as diplomatic pressures 
may apply; by the same token, foreign support to the opposition, when possible, could 
be a strong factor. As mentioned earlier foreign aid comes as a result of a do ut des 
compromise, a return from the country is expected, in terms of support for democracy 
or enhanced diplomatic relations. However it is important to explore how the 
instructions of foreign powers are perceived and interpreted at the local level. Do 
recipients follow a suggested path because they believe in it or because they think it is 
the best way to gain access to financial resources? There is also the question of how 
external forces have succeeded in influencing domestic policies.
External forces can penetrate a country through political and economic 
channels but recent tendencies have shown that foreign powers are also keen to 
concentrate on civil society,11 which is the fourth variable. Given its particular 
position in between politics and the polity, it is important to explore the significance 
of civil society. This varies from country to country and depends on historical 
traditions, current human resources, practical knowledge and financial resources. It is 
also useful to understand what influence civil society has in a country’s politics, 
popular attitudes and behaviour.
The fifth and final variable we would mention is the people. The people could 
be considered the main point of the revolution, given that power depends on people, 
directly or indirectly.12 As important as organized movement there is the silent 
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11 Tordjman, “Surfing the wave”. In: Ó Beacháin/Polese (Hg.), Coloured Revolutions in Eurasia 1998-
2005.
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9struggle of people who can refuse, on a personal basis, to support the government13 . 
However, since a major resource of the opposition are street protests, it is important to 
understand how and why people react to stimuli from politics and civil society and to 
what extent they are able to organize by themselves or to follow a leader. Some 
questions would include: how motivated do they become during the process and how 
much are they willing to risk? How do the authorities and the opposition perceive 
these people? Does the opposition think that their help is going to be crucial? Do the 
authorities overlook them because they feel the people will never represent a threat or 
do they tend to try and control them even more? 
Table 1: Conditions of Colour Revolutions
State Ruling 
Elites
Opposition External 
Influence
Civil Society Population
Armenia Few natural 
resources and 
weak state 
Relatively 
permissive 
but 
repressive 
if 
challenged
Fragile unity 
occasionally 
achieved but 
prone to 
division
Considered a 
Russian ally 
but also 
recipient of 
much US 
assistance
Active Relatively 
active
Azerbaijan Resource rich 
with 
expanding 
economy but 
weak 
political 
Relatively 
permissive 
but 
repressive 
if 
challenged
Well resourced 
but divided and 
lacking 
alternative 
ideology or 
policies
Weak Active, at least 
nominally
Moderately 
active
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institutions
Belarus Fairly strong Repressive Unable to 
compact
Dependent on 
Russia for 
energy. Weak 
western 
influence as 
many sanctions 
already applied
Relatively 
active, though 
frequently 
repressed
Relatively 
active but 
few are 
radically 
against the 
regime
Georgia Few natural 
resources and 
weak 
institutions
Relatively 
permissive 
and pro-
West
Usually divided 
but important 
elements 
compacted in 
2003
Large US 
assistance
Developed Active
Kazakhstan Oil rich, 
fairly strong 
economy but 
weak 
political 
institutions
Repressive Small and 
disunited
Weak Activities 
closely 
monitored and 
circumscribed
Passive, 
consider 
themselves 
well-off and 
stable by 
standards of 
the region
Kyrgyzstan Few natural 
resources and 
weak state
Relatively 
permissive
Many small 
opposition 
parties with 
little 
ideological 
underpinning, 
difficult to unite
Only CIS 
country to host 
US and 
Russian 
military bases. 
Large aid 
recipient in 
1990s
Western-funded 
NGOs 
developed in 
capital, clan 
networks 
important 
elsewhere
Outside the 
capital, clan 
networks 
predominat
e as people 
mobiliser, 
large 
emigration 
Moldova Fairly strong Relatively 
permissive 
Disunited and 
with different 
Both the EU 
and Russia 
Quite active. 
NGO sector has 
People are 
involved in 
11
and pro-
West
visions influence, the 
latter in energy 
and territorial 
disputes
been growing 
since 
independence
protests but 
confused by 
too similar 
political 
manifestos, 
large 
emigration
Russia Strong with 
rich natural 
resources
Increasingl
y 
Repressive
Active but
harshly 
repressed by the 
authorities and 
not always well 
coordinated 
Weak Active but 
under 
increasingly 
tight control of 
the authorities, 
thus de facto 
decreasing
Passive
Ukraine Strong Relatively 
permissive
United in 2004 Dependence on 
Russia for 
energy supply
Developed Apparently 
passive but 
frequently 
mobilized 
since 2001
Uzbekistan Significant 
natural 
resources but 
very weak 
institutions
Very 
Repressive
No opposition 
parties 
permitted
Weak, 
increasingly 
aligned with 
Russia
Strongly 
repressed by the
authorities
Passive
Tajikistan Few natural 
resources, 
very poor, 
weak 
political 
institutions 
Repressive Opposition 
parties unable 
to unite and 
vulnerable to 
cooption by 
regime
Dependent on 
Russian 
military 
support, 
investment and 
remittances
Weak Passive, 
fear of 
renewed 
civil war, 
large 
emigration
12
Turkmenistan Rich in 
natural 
resources but 
very weak 
institutions
Very 
repressive
No opposition 
parties 
permitted
Official 
neutrality and 
hostility to 
foreign 
alliances
Weak Passive, 
substantial 
emigration 
of Russians 
since 1991
Bessinger has shown how such tendencies can be diffused from country to country; 
when victorious revolutions occur the chances of similar events happening in other 
states increases for a time as protesters imitate these successful models.14 A revolution 
in a neighbouring country can galvanize the opposition as structural requirements for 
a revolution diminish and new political opportunities and possibilities are seen to 
emerge. Likewise the authorities may learn from neighbouring states what they need 
to do to avoid that situation. This is why in the course of this paper countries will be 
presented chronologically, based on when elections took place, with a view to 
illustrating the “state of affairs” of the colour revolution phenomenon at any given 
moment. Finally, looking a the dates of each election or protest (Table 2), it would 
appear that once similar protest movements occur at the same time, at least one is 
going to fail. As all eyes focus on the election most likely to produce a colour 
revolution, other contests occurring at the same time are pushed into the background 
and lose one resource generally at the disposal of the opposition during a colour 
revolution, that being intense international attention and pressure to conform with 
election standards. So, for example, parliamentary elections in Tajikistan in February 
and March 2005 received scant attention compared to those in Kyrgyzstan. 
13
Uzbekistan’s 2004 parliamentary elections were entirely eclipsed by Yushchenko’s 
third round presidential victory of the same day.
Table 2: Elections in the Commonwealth of Independent States
Elections (Attempted) 
Revolution
Result
Armenia 19 February and 5 March 2003, 
(presidential); 25 May 2003 
(parliamentary); 27 November 
2005 (only referendum);
April 2004 Opposition defeat
Georgia 2 November 2003
(parliamentary)
November 2003 Rose Revolution: President 
Shevardnadze deposed and 
replaced by Mikheil 
Saakashvili in January 
2004 elections (96% for 
Saakashvili)
Russia December 2003 (parliamentary)
14 March 2004 (presidential)
None No change
Ukraine 31 October 2004 (presidential) November 2004 Orange Revolution: Defeat 
for Victor Yanukovich, 
Victor Yushchenko elected 
President (5-% for 
Yushchenko)
Uzbekistan 2004 (26 December)
Parliamentary
Andijan, 13 May 2005 Massacre
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Tajikistan Tajikistan 27 February and 13 
March 2005 (Parliamentary)
None No change
Moldova 6 March 2005 (Parliamentary) 2003-5: Ruling 
communist party 
changes orientation from 
Russia to the West
“Silent revolution”
Kyrgyzstan 27 February and 13 March 2005 
(parliamentary)
March 2005 Tulip Revolution: 
President Askar Akaev 
ousted and replaced by 
Kurmanbek Bakiev whose 
presidency is confirmed in 
July 2005 election (89% 
for Bakiev)
Azerbaijan 15 October 2003 (presidential)
6 November 2005 
(parliamentary)
October 2003, 
November 2005
Opposition defeat
Kazakhstan 19 September and 3 October 
2004 (parliamentary), 
December 2005 (presidential)
None No change
Belarus 13 and 17 October 2004 
(parliamentary and 
referendum); 19 March 2006 
(presidential)
12 April 2002 (“We 
can’t live like this”); 
October 2004, March 
2006
Opposition defeat
Turkmenistan December 2004 (parliamentary) 
February 2007 (presidential)
None No change
15
II. Georgia: The Rose Revolution
While everyone afterwards could cite compelling reasons why the Rose Revolution in 
November 2003 should occur in Georgia, no one prophesied it. Eduard Shevardnadze, 
the dominant political figure in Georgia for three decades bestrode national politics 
like a colossus and appeared politically immortal. Shevardnadze’s strength belied the 
weakness of the state and throughout his reign the “silver fox”, as he was known, had 
to maintain a delicate balancing act against competing forces in Georgian politics. His 
managerial skills had helped Georgia overcome the instability of the early 1990s but 
by the end of the decade he oversaw Georgia’s descent into one of the most corrupt 
societies on earth.15
Shevardnadze had made it clear he would step down after the 2005 
presidential elections, when he would be 77 years old. His support base had already 
collapsed and local elections in 2002 confirmed what opinion polls had already 
revealed - that popular approval for Shevardnadze was in single digits. His Citizens 
Union of Georgia (CUG) that had triumphed in the 1995 and 2000 elections imploded 
as all reformers defected. Chief among these were Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze 
and Mikheil Saakashvili. Western-educated and representing the affluent constituency 
of Vake, Saakashvili had seen his support surge as his “Tbilisi without Shevardnadze” 
slogan proved a winner with voters in the local elections. He now set his sights on a 
Georgia without Shevardnadze and parliamentary elections on 2 November 2003, 
marred by serious irregularities and voter fraud, provided the catalyst for the Rose 
16
Revolution. Under American pressure, Shevardnadze had accepted an NGO-organised 
parallel vote tabulation (PVT) for the elections and exit polls were also employed 
throughout the country. Together these gave a detailed electoral snapshot shortly after 
the closing of the polls. Saakashvili’s National Movement’s topped the poll with 27% 
of the vote and three other opposition parties – Labour, the Burjanadze-Democrats 
and the New Rights Party – came in third, fourth and sixth place garnering 35% of the 
vote between them. The PVTs gave Shevardnadze’s party For a New Georgia less 
than a fifth of the vote (19%) and an allied party, Industry Will Save Georgia, failed 
to make the 7% threshold. A steady stream of stories suggesting substantial electoral 
irregularities prompted people to take to the streets in increasingly large numbers.
Throughout the protests, Shevardnadze’s legendary powers of compromise 
and cooption deserted him. Though he did speak directly to the protesters and 
opposition leaders, he underestimated the level of frustration and the strength of 
opposition sentiment. This was not surprising perhaps since he knew the opposition 
leaders intimately having given them their first break and ministerial positions. As the 
protests grew bigger, Shevardnadze vacillated, hoping that the winter cold would 
diminish popular enthusiasm for demonstrations. Eighteen days passed before, on 20 
November, official results were released which put Shevardnadze’s party in first 
place, the “Revival” party in second and Saakashvili’s National Movement in third. 
Apart from being pushed from first to third place, the figures provided for the Revival 
were particularly galling. Revival was the party of local strongman Aslan Abashidze, 
who ruled the police-state of Adjara as a private fiefdom. Adjara was a painful 
reminder of the weakness of the Tbilisi government as it was unable to impose its will 
on the errant republic; effectively Abashidze headed an independent state that paid 
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modest homage to Tbilisi but no taxes or custom duties. As Shevardnadze’s position 
became ever weaker he reached out to Abashidze to provide a crutch. The price was 
accepting the completely imaginary results from the Adjaran province, facilitating a 
greater role for Abashidze in the running of Georgian affairs. For many Georgians 
such an alliance, and on such a pretext, was akin to national apostasy and further 
indicated that there were no limits to how far Shevardnadze would go to remain in 
power.
The main details of the Rose Revolution are well-known; large rallies, 
mobilising 100,000 on occasion kept a constant presence outside of parliament 
buildings. On 22 November, as Shevardnadze read his speech to open the legislature, 
security protecting parliament faded away and an advance party of protesters led by 
Saakashvili burst into parliament shouting “resign, resign”. Shevardnadze was spirited 
away by his bodyguards and tried to regain the initiative by declaring a state of 
emergency though this was not implemented by the security apparatus. With the 
speaker of parliament Nino Burjanadze, at Saakashvili’s request, having declared 
herself Acting President, a conflict of legitimacy emerged that fortunately never 
escalated into a civil war. After meeting with Saakashvili and Zhvania, Shevardnadze 
resigned. Complete national unity was momentarily achieved after the resignation of 
Shevardnadze rather than before. Saakashvili received 96% of the vote in the 
presidential elections of January 2004 though as subsequent events were to 
demonstrate this overwhelming mandate was rather fragile. 
A number of factors can be cited to explain why the Rose Revolution occurred 
in Georgia. The role of the media was crucial. Rustavi 2, the independent television 
channel, was emboldened by Shevardnadze’s failed attempts to shut down the station 
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in 2001 and throughout the crisis advertised opposition gatherings in advance and 
gave them comprehensive and favourable coverage. External forces played a role but 
this has been exaggerated by many, particularly Russian, accounts. The United States 
and several European countries, particularly Germany, had generously supported 
Shevardnadze and this was complemented by aid from international organisations 
aimed at facilitating democratisation efforts in Georgia. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, 
Georgia was one of the largest recipients of US aid per capita in the world. After the 
2000 elections, however, there was a noticeable dampening of enthusiasm for 
Shevardnadze in the West though important military assistance was given to help 
Georgia meet challenges in the Pankisi gorge. In 2003, however, the US announced 
funding cuts and the IMF declared it was suspending assistance to the Shevardnadze 
government.16 Funding for non-governmental organizations in Georgia remained 
constant however. The National Democratic Institute and the Liberty Institute was 
particularly active, the later providing some able figures in Saakashvili’s 
administration. The youth organization, Kmara, has received special attention as it 
was modelled on Serbia’s OTPOR and, indeed, the Soros Foundation in Georgia 
funded trips to Serbia for opposition leaders like Mikheil Saakashvili and the National 
Democratic Institute to meet with OTPOR and it was from these meetings that Kmara 
emerged.17 The Soros Foundation provided funds for Kmara and other organisations 
during the election with the remit of promoting voter education and Kmara adopted a 
confrontational, often tongue in cheek, style of campaigning.18 Notwithstanding the 
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unmistakable funding from abroad, foreign actors played a remarkably quiescent role 
during the Rose Revolution. Despite disliking Shevardnadze, Russia preferred an old 
familiar adversary to a new unpredictable one while the United States had learned to 
live with disappointment and never considered supporting Shevardnadze’s premature 
departure. During November 2003, both Russia and the US offered mediation not 
meddling and both states were surprised at the route events took. 
The opposition, while not entirely united, had reached a critical mass 
sufficient to discredit the elections and provide a focus for a disenfranchised 
electorate.19 The most critical element to the success of the Rose Revolution was 
popular mobilization, which added so much weight to opposition demands and 
credibility. It was this ingredient that was to be borrowed by the Ukrainian opposition 
during the Orange Revolution.
III. Armenia: three strikes, not out
The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan were deeply unsettled by the ousting of 
their neighbour in Georgia. Both had issued strong public endorsements of 
Shevardnadze during the November 2003 crisis and given the status of Shevardnadze 
compared to Armenian and Azeri presidents Kocharian and Aliev, who had never 
risen above domestic politics, the attitude was very much “if it happened to 
Shevardnadze, it could certainly happen to us”. Armenia’s post-communist political 
development has occurred in a state of siege. Squeezed between a hostile Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, both of whom maintain an embargo on Armenia as a result of the frozen 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia’s political elite have exploited political 
20
uncertainty to maintain a monopoly of power. Opposition can only help Armenia’s 
enemies, President Kocharian frequently argued, himself a native of Nagorno-
Karabakh.20
Both the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections of February/March 
(there were two rounds) and May respectively were rigged and gave rise to 
spontaneous though inconclusive popular protests involving several thousand 
people.21 The opposition could not decide whether to participate in the second round 
of presidential elections (as encouraged by runner-up Stepan Demirchian) or boycott 
them (as advocated by Artashes Geghamian who came third).22 The second round, 
also marred by systemic irregularities and vote rigging, gave Kocharian victory with 
67.5% of the vote, the highest ever received by a presidential candidate since Armenia 
regained independence in 1991. Sergei Sarkisian, the powerful Defence Minister who 
had conducted Kocharian’s campaign, rejected OSCE criticisms and attributed them 
to the fact that Western observers were not as familiar with the “Armenian mentality” 
as their CIS counterparts who endorsed the elections.23
The opposition in Armenia, traditionally weak and divided, was heartened by 
Shevardnadze’s fall and the more optimistic wondered whether the same fate might 
befall the veteran Kocharian. Within a month of Saakashvili’s election as president of 
Georgia, the two main opposition parties staged a walkout, on 2 February 2004, from 
the Armenian legislature and announced a parliamentary boycott in response to the 
                                                                                                                                      
19 It is often forgotten that the opposition Labour and New Right parties decided not to collaborate with 
the protests and attended the aborted inaugural meeting of the disputed parliament. 
20 See de Waal, Black Garden. On Kocharian’s rise to the presidency see ibid., pp. 256-261.
21 Of the presidential election, the OSCE said ‘the overall process failed to provide equal conditions for 
the candidates. Vote counting and tabulation showed serious irregularities, including widespread ballot 
box stuffing’. OSCE/OIHR, Republic of Armenia Presidential Elections.
22 ‘Armenia Faces Presidential Run-Off Amid Ballot-Stuffing Complaints’, Eurasia Insight 20 
February 2003. 
23 ‘Violations … were not massive’, the CIS report claimed, ‘On the whole, we believe that they did 
not influence the course of the elections’. Danielyan, Armenia Poll Sparks Domestic Outcry. In: 
Eurasia Insight, 7 March 2004.
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pro-Kocharian majority cutting off a debate to initiate a confidence plebiscite in the 
President. At a news conference the following day, Geghamian said the parliament 
was illegitimate and that the boycott would spark a ‘parliamentary crisis’.24
Having raised the stakes, government and opposition were now on a collision 
course. On 29 March, a day after police confronted protesters in Armenia’s second 
city, Gyumri, parliament initiated legislation to give the police more powers to break-
up rallies, particularly those considered a threat to the constitutional order (the 
legislation passed all stages by May). On 1 April, the prosecutor’s office in Yerevan 
brought forward criminal charges against the opposition alliance relating to the 
unsanctioned rallies, which, according to the charges, called for regime change though 
violence and ‘overthrowing the existing constitutional order’.25 During the first week 
of April, over two hundred opposition activists were arrested. On 5 April, Demirchian 
and Geghamian came together for a rare joint press conference during which they 
reiterated their claim that Kocharian had stolen the elections and advertised their 
upcoming mass rally on 9 April.26 Four days of protests were called for with the 
explicit objective of forcing Kocharian to resign. The protests would start on the 9 
April, the first anniversary of Kocharian’s inauguration for a second term, and 
culminate on the 12 April, the opposition’s deadline for parliament to accept their 
proposal for a no-confidence plebiscite on the president. Leaders of the Justice Bloc 
stated their intention of surrounding the presidential palace and nearby parliament 
buildings with tens of thousands of supporters who would occupy these areas 
continuously until Kocharian stepped down. For the government it seemed clear that 
this was an attempt to replicate the events of Tbilisi. Having failed to reverse the 
                                               
24 Id., Armenian Opposition Mounts Fresh Attack. In: Eurasia Insight, 6 February 2004.
25 Peuch, Armenia: Government Threatens Opposition. In: RFE/RL Newsline, 1 April 2004. 
26 Eurasia Insight, ‘Armenian Authorities Carry Out Preemptive Roundup of Opposition Activists’, 6 
April 2004.
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results of 2003, the opposition had been emboldened by Shevardnadze’s political 
demise and were seeking to use similar methods in Armenia to orchestrate 
Kocharian’s downfall. The demonstration on 9 April attracted up to 25,000 people 
and all speakers called on Kocharian to resign but as the deadline of 12 April 
approached it became clear that the government was unlikely to relent.
Despite warnings from police that the event was illegal, up to fifteen thousand 
protesters marched through central Yerevan on the 12th but were blocked by a heavy 
security presence from reaching the presidential residence on Marshal Baghramian 
Avenue, just before parliament buildings. Parliament was protected with barbed wire 
and defended by riot police armed with water canons. The crowd stopped and chanted 
“Kocharian, Resign” and, in a clear attempt to copy the tactics used in Tbilisi, two 
thousand activists camped overnight close to the presidential office. President 
Kocharian didn’t need to have the parallels with Georgia underlined further and was 
determined not to meet Shevardnadze’s end. At 2 a.m., riot police used stun grenades 
and water canon to disperse the campers and arrested 115 activists.27 As part of the 
crackdown the offices of three leading opposition parties, National Unity Party 
(AMK), the Peoples Party of Armenia and the Republican Party, all vocal critics of 
the Kocharian regime, were ransacked and temporarily closed down. The house of 
numerous opposition activists were raided by police and three opposition 
parliamentarians were taken into custody. Other opposition leaders went temporarily 
into hiding. Kocharian made a nationwide address on state television in which he 
blamed the opposition for the clashes.
Kocharian had weathered the storm and put down the first attempt to emulate 
the Rose Revolution elsewhere in the Caucasus. The Armenian government was 
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supported by its traditional ally Russia and was subjected to only mild chastisement 
by Western powers. Organized opposition wilted in the face of state repression and 
the fractious united bloc began to go their separate ways. Though in many respects the 
opposition was, and remains, composed of disenchanted privileged groups and the 
battle with Kocharian had the character of a struggle between competing elites, no one 
doubted there existed a large reservoir of apathetic and marginalized people who, 
given suitable circumstances, might be mobilized for change. The real cleavage in 
Armenia, as in many other post-soviet republics, has not so much been between the 
parties offering themselves for high office but between the small group of haves and 
the vast majority of have-nots.
IV. Russia: preserving hegemony 
Where Georgians saw roses, Moscow could only see the thorns while what took shape 
on the streets of Bishkek looked less like a tulip than a weed. The Orange Revolution, 
and the resultant election of a pro-Western president in Ukraine, was painted as a 
major geopolitical defeat for the Kremlin and a major reverse for Putin personally 
who had so publicly backed Yanukovich. The fear of a chain reaction, or domino 
effect, permeated Russia’s political elite. In an article published in the government 
daily newspaper, Rossiiskaya gazeta, it was argued that should Moscow fail to 
reassert its position in Ukraine within two years then “velvet revolutions” would take 
place according to the same scenario in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
                                                                                                                                      
27 Accounts of what happened taken from a number of sources including the US Department of State, 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Armenia 2004, section 2b. Reports published by 
Freedom House, Eurasianet and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty were also employed.
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and, possibly, in Armenia. In the event of such catastrophes the Kremlin might find its 
‘room for manoeuvre in the post-Soviet space’ seriously curtailed.28
There was a clear strategy on the part of the Kremlin and its supporters to tar 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan with the same brush. Speaking in Yerevan the day 
after Akaev’s toppling, Putin said that what had happened in Kyrgyzstan was ‘not 
anything unexpected for us’ and was a result of ‘weakness of power’ but  
‘accumulated socio-economic problems’. At the same time he expressed regret that 
‘once more in a country in the post-soviet area, political issues are decided by 
unlawful means, accompanied by riots and human causalities’.29 By saying that ‘once 
more’ violence and anarchy had descended on a post-soviet state was to suggest that 
this was what had occurred in Georgia and Ukraine. Looting and vandalism by 
uncontrolled mobs were something that could easily be written off as undesirable 
models. The key lesson to be learned was to build a state capable of withstanding any 
assault. The colour revolutions had raised the stakes and started alarm bells ringing. In 
a 2005 interview, Russian opposition leader Gary Kasparov summarised the Kremlin 
position thus:
I don't think they care about publicity now; I think this regime is paranoid. They watched 
the Georgian revolution and they probably got confused. They watched revolution in 
Ukraine and they got very angry. They saw revolution in Kyrgyzia [Kyrgyzstan] and they 
panicked. And now they saw Uzbekistan and I think they went absolutely mad. They've 
gone mad and these people are causing a real threat now not just for Russia but for the 
rest of the world because they don't believe they can keep power peacefully, they don't 
believe they can win real elections. It seems to me, and it is a tragic conclusion, that this 
                                               
28 As quoted in Torbakov, Russian Policy Experts Believe Ukraine’s Revolutionary Fervor is 
Contagious. In: Eurasia Insight, 20 December 2004.
29Kremlin press release, 24 March 2005,  http://www.rusembcanada.mid.ru/pr/190405_1_e.html
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regime has made a conscious decision to stay in power as long as they can - using all 
means.30
Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that Putin has explicitly linked socio-
economic factors to regime change, he has made a determined effort to impoverish the 
colour regimes in Tbilisi and Kyiv. Since Mikheil Saakashvili took office, all 
communication lines between Georgia and Russia have been cut off; it remains 
impossible at the time of writing (March 2008) to travel by road, rail or air between 
Moscow and Tbilisi nor is it possible to post a letter between the two countries. 
Almost all of Georgia’s main agricultural products are prohibited from entering the 
Russian market in what is an embargo in all but name.31 The ostensible reason is that 
Georgian wine and mineral water, firm favourites in Russia since Soviet times, do not 
meet Russian health standards; we are supposed to believe that health standards in 
Russia, where the average male life expectancy is just 59, are higher than, say, 
Germany or Britain where Georgian products are exported unimpeded. A similar 
tactic has been used against Moldova, another country that from a Kremlin 
perspective has been moving outside the Russian orbit and towards the West despite 
the leverage Russia enjoys in helping or hindering an amelioration of the 
Transnistrian issue. The cost of the wine ban to Moldova was even greater than for 
Georgia. Wine exports constituted one quarter of all Moldovan exports in 2005, 80% 
of which was sold to Russia. Wine sales dropped by half in 2006 as new markets were 
difficult to procure at short notice. As part of a comprehensive package that involved 
Moldova removing its veto on Russia joining the WTO, Kremlin concerns over the 
quality of Moldovan wine disappeared as quickly as they had emerged. The tactic has 
proved counter-productive with Georgia as that country exploits the opportunity to 
                                               
30 Gary Kasparov, interviewed by the BBC, Russian Godfathers, Part II: The Prisoner (BBC 2006).
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reorient its trade towards new partners particularly in Europe and Kazakhstan. The 
Saakashvili administration has modelled its approach on that of Estonia, which too 
faced an embargo and intense Russian pressure in the 1990s in an attempt to steer the 
Baltic republic away from a path to the EU and NATO. It is no coincidence therefore 
that, despite Russian objections, former Estonian premier Mart Laar is Saakashvili’s 
chief economic advisor.32 Ukraine has also paid a heavy political price for its colour 
revolution and drift away from Russia. As in Georgia gas prices have increased 
dramatically (the price quadrupled in 2005-6) and supplies have been cut. Such 
punitive measures are not just targeted at Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova but are 
intended to have a demonstration effect; post-soviet countries will see that it pays to 
stay on the right side of the Kremlin.
V. Ukraine: oranges blossom in November
An active civil society, compact opposition, massive popular mobilization, balanced 
external forces and a regime that repressed in moderation created the conditions for 
what has become known as the Orange Revolution. By 2004, street protests in 
Ukraine had already become a well-used way of expressing dissent; they had been 
used in 1990 to protest against Moscow rule and re-emerged during the Kuchmagate 
movement in 2001 and 2002. In 2004 people were called on to the streets several 
times before the revolutionary protests of November functioning as a sort of 
psychological training as elections approached. Popular mobilization was matched by 
                                                                                                                                      
31 Countries are reluctant to use the word “embargo” since this is considered an act of war under 
international law. 
32 Laar was appointed by the United Nations Development Programme and is paid by this body.
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an increasingly active civil society and independent media33 despite overwhelming 
government control of information.34
Civil society benefited from external aid that complemented pre-existing 
networks encouraging civil disobedience. The US alone allocated more than 65 
million dollars in 2003/2004 to support democratic initiatives in Ukraine including 
independent media and NGO training. The Open Society Institute instituted a fund 
from which NGOs could obtain election monitoring know-how. Support was also 
granted in the form of trainings in capacity building and non-violent methods of 
protest. Since 2000, Ukrainian NGO leaders and activists had been invited to 
international trainings in non-violent protest methods and civil disobedience.35 As a 
complementary strategy, activists from Otpor (Serbia) and Kmara (Georgia) visited 
Ukraine to train local leaders.36
Western assistance extended to opposition parties, at least in the form of 
diplomatic pressures and support for the “Orange Coalition”. However, this was 
largely balanced by an equally intrusive attitude on the part of Moscow. For their part, 
the EU and US, while acknowledging Ukraine’s low standards in human rights, media 
freedom, and electoral practices, made clear that they hoped, or even expected, that 
elections would be fair and free.37
Opposition parties played a major role in the Ukrainian protests. A coalition 
had failed to materialize in 2002 facilitating a pro-government coalition to win a 
                                               
33 For instance Kanal 5 or newspapers like Ukrainska Pravda, Zerkalo nedeli, Den.
34 Practice of the Ukrainian presidential administration was to issue some temniky to give instructions 
on what could be said and what should better be avoided mentioning during the news.
35 Cf. Kuzio, Ukrainian Leaders Crack Down. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1 (109), 20 October 
2004; Corwin, East: Regime Change. In: RFE/RL, 19 April 2005. 
36 For an exhaustive picture of the training modules, strategies and actions see Krivokapic, Les faiseurs 
des revolutions. In: Politique Internationale, (2005) 106. See also Kolesnikova, Interv'u z Mikhailom 
Svistonchem.
37 There were strong allegations that the mayoral elections held in April 2004 in Mukachevo, a town in 
western Ukraine, had been falsified. The EU did not take any official position but based on this event 
urged Ukraine to exert more control on the processing of election results.
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majority despite Nasha Ukraina garnering the largest vote of any party in the country. 
In 2004 rivalries were put aside and Yushchenko could count on the support not only 
of his bloc but on Yulia Timoshenko and, after the second round, on Oleksandr 
Moroz, leader of the socialist party. This alliance meant that in the end Yushchenko 
was endorsed by more than half of Ukraine’s active electorate. 
Claims that under Kuchma Ukraine deviated from a democratic path, while 
justified, should be compared with the situation pertaining in some neighbouring 
states. Though at least eighteen journalists had died in mysterious circumstances since 
1991, and while the president was even alleged to have ordered the murder of a 
journalist and transformed the country into a blackmail state38 seeds of democracy had 
been allowed to take root. Already in 2002 an opposition party (Nasha Ukraina bloc) 
was allowed to gain the largest number of seats and the ruling regime could enter a 
coalition only at the price of cooperating with the communists. The alliance between 
communists and oligarchs was unstable but boosted political pluralism by splitting the 
forces in parliament. Likewise it allowed for the development of a strong civil society, 
independent newspapers and TV channels. Despite government attempts to close 
Channel 5 with tax demands, the station remained on air due to mass protests. In 
addition, Ukraine proved quite sensitive to Western criticisms; although incapable of 
complying with Western standards, and more interested in personal gain, Kuchma 
clearly showed a concern for his reputation in the West. The pro-government forces 
were far from being compact and succeeded to find a common tongue only in 
moments of crisis,39 being normally unable to overcome ideological and personal 
differences. The attitude of the regime was crucial in allowing the preconditions for 
the development of a protest environment but also for its survival, since disagreement 
                                               
38 Kuzio, Parliamentary Elections. In: PRISM, 8 (2002) 1.
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on the use of force prevented a police action that might have meant the end of the 
protests.40
The above mentioned pre-conditions resulted in an open confrontation 
between the government and the opposition. A first round had to give the impression 
of fair and free elections with Viktor Yushchenko having a slight advantage on his 
opponent Viktor Yanukovich: 39.87 against 39.32 percent. The second round was 
then managed in order to make Yanukovich winner by around 3% of the vote. The 
opposition then deployed all its forces; independent exit polls showed the real results 
of the elections while opposition forces connected with civil society movements and 
tried to prompt people to challenge government legitimacy. Ukrainians mobilised in 
large numbers with protesters in Kyiv constantly in the region of several hundred 
thousand people, reaching a peak of one million people on Saturday the 26th of 
November. 
As a result of this total blockade, the government was obliged to enter into
negotiations with the opposition. Russian and EU delegates were invited to mediate 
and a political compromise was reached. Repetition of the second round was agreed 
but only after the constitutional reform transforming Ukraine into a parliamentary 
republic was passed, so that presidential powers would be limited from the time of the 
next parliamentary elections (2006) onwards. Further to the invalidation of the 
election results by the Supreme Court, a third round was set for 26 December and 
Yushchenko reported a victory with 52% over 44.19% for Yanukovich, who had 
already been removed from his Prime Ministerial post. A new moment of Ukrainian 
history began; the country became politically more unstable (as shown in the early 
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2007 early elections and the 2006 political crisis) but this was due to the incapacity of 
a fraction to prevail over the others and is deemed to be healthy for democracy.41
President Kuchma did not need to flee the country and was allowed to retire quietly so 
long as he stayed out of politics. 
VI. Moldova: the grape revolution 
The year 2005 was a year of revolutionary expectations in the former USSR. Given 
that many CIS counties were holding elections during that year many thought an 
avalanche of colour revolutions would follow the Georgian and Ukrainian 
revolutions. The spread of the revolutionary virus from Tbilisi to Kyiv had surprised 
many and when the Kyrgyz revolution materialized, the question before every 
subsequent election was less “who will win” than “what is going to be the result of 
this attempted revolution”. Moldova did not experience any revolution following the 
elections despite some expectations42 and this was due to a number of factors. The 
2005 elections came after a radical change in the attitude of the governing party, the 
Communist Party of Moldova that has ruled the country since 200143 and whose 
leader, Vladimir Voronin, is also head of state. 
The policy platform presented by the Moldovan communists at the 2005 
parliamentary elections did not differ greatly from other parties, which is why 
political polarization was not a feature of the election.44 To understand this 
                                               
41 We refer to the Linz and Stepan’s expression, “when democracy is the only game in town”. See 
Linz/Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
42 ‘Moldova and the next colorful revolution’ Stratfor 19 February 2005; see also Corwin, Is Russia 
Hoping for Revolution in Moldova? In: RFE/RL, 7 March 2005.
43 At the 2001 elections the communists passed from 40 to 71 mandates in parliament. Quite impressive 
a figure if one considers that the Moldovan parliament has 101 seats.
44 Bransten, Moldova: Voters Back Communists. In: RFE/RL, 7 March 2005; Cashu, Why an Orange 
Revolution is Unlikely. In: RFE/RL, 6 March 2005.
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standardization of opinion one should refer to Moldova’s territorial disputes. Since 
1992 Moldova witnessed two attempts at separation; one from the Gagauz region, 
promptly solved, and the other from Transnistria, still ongoing. This Russian speaking 
buffer between Moldova and Ukraine had become the shelter of Russian speaking 
elites since the 1970s and sought autonomy as soon as the Soviet Union collapsed. As 
Transnistria was the main source of energy and industries for Moldova, a quiet 
resolution and independence appeared highly improbable; however this territorial 
dispute has drawn the attention of the international community with Russia and the 
EU invited into the crisis-solving negotiations. Russia in particular has often 
advocated a higher level of autonomy for Transnistria, possibly with the expectation 
that the region will join Russia.45 Strongly dependent on Russia for energy supplies, 
the communist party elite has been swinging between East and West until a more 
radical Kremlin position after the 2002 Istanbul summit made clear that a closer 
relationship with Moscow might necessitate the effective loss of Transnistria to 
Russia. Faced with these conditions the communists radically changed their position 
and adopted a more pro-Western attitude,46 despite Russian bans on Moldovan wine 
and threats to increase the price of natural resources. This volte face was also 
influenced by a desire not to be wrong-footed as the popular mood swung away from 
Russia and towards closer ties with the West. 
                                               
45 In 2006 Transnistria held a referendum whose questions were: 1) Do you support the course towards 
the independence of Transnistria and the subsequent free association with the Russian Federation? 
(Yes: 97.2 percent - No: 1.9 - Invalid/undecided: 0.9%); 2) Do you consider it possible to renounce 
Transnistria's independent status and subsequently become part of the Republic of Moldova? (Yes: 3.3 
percent - No: 94.9 - Invalid/undecided: 1.8).
46 President Voronin is reported to have met with presidents Yushchenko and Saakashvili before the 
2005 elections to bolster his policy of reorientating his government towards the West.
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The West had given Moldova mixed signals. While accepting Moldovan 
membership of the WTO and supporting democratic reform in the country47 it never 
offered Moldova assistance or financial aid in the same quantities as it had to 
countries like Ukraine or Georgia. One of the reasons is certainly that a more pro-
Western Moldova would mean a more pro-Eastern Transnistria and pragmatism 
suggested that in media stat virtus. Despite the risk that the communists might turn 
back towards Moscow, the West does not consider worthwhile efforts to oppose the 
regime by supporting its political opponents who have a similar programme.
In the 6 March 2005 elections, the Communist Party retained its dominant 
position despite seeing its parliamentary strength drop from 71 to 56. The Democratic 
Bloc of Moldova (DBM) won 34 and the Christian Democratic People’s Party 
(CDPP) 11.48 Russia had made clear that anybody but Voronin would be embraced 
but it lacked a figure in the opposition who it could wholeheartedly endorse. This 
reinforced another structural deficiency for would-be revolutionaries to overcome, the 
lack of opposition unity. The CDPP shared many policies with the “new” Communist 
Party including a pro-Western orientation while the DBM was only moderately 
against President Voronin as demonstrated by the fact that they did not oppose a 
second term for him when it came to a parliamentary vote.
The Moldovan electorate, for their part, proved to be quite passive as 
demonstrated by the low electoral turnouts for mayoral elections and even 
parliamentary ones49 and this inertia is accentuated by the lack of colour in the 
political party spectrum. This combination of a passive electorate and lack of party 
                                               
47 On 18 February 2005, the US government dispatched US 1.7 million to support democracy 
promotion projects. Organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Soros 
Foundation are active in the country.
48 The threshold to enter parliament is 6% in Moldova and those parties mentioned are the only ones 
that secured representation in the 2005 elections.
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diversity partially explains why NGOs did not play a major role in consolidating anti-
government sentiment, despite having strongly developed since independence.50
A revolution in Moldova lacked a main component present in all other colour 
revolution attempts - electoral fraud. Whereas the OSCE criticised the 2005 
parliamentary election campaign as not meeting democratic standards, the election 
itself were credited as being fair and free. Thus, the opposition could not demonstrate 
government bad-faith in such an effective way and were denied a crucial trigger event 
that could inspire and mobilise.51 Though there were criticisms and attempted 
protests, the opposition, organised civil society and ordinary people failed to 
coordinate their efforts, and any efforts were eclipsed by the unfolding drama in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
VII. Kyrgyzstan: when roses become tulips
After the Orange revolution, Kyrgyzstan was considered the country most likely to 
succumb to a colour revolution as it combined some of the structural weaknesses and 
political opportunities afforded to opposition activists in Georgia and Ukraine. Some 
expected, rightly as it turned out, that parliamentary elections held on 27 February and 
13 March 2005 would trigger the regime’s demise. President Akaev, a politician by 
accident, had liberal instincts, reinforced by his country’s lack of natural resources 
which, unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, did not allow him much 
room for independent action. Surrounded by poor or unfriendly states and unable to 
sell oil to the West, Akaev decided early on that his best bet was to offer America a 
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democratic success story. With a raft of progressive legislation introduced in the early 
1990s, Kyrgyzstan achieved a string of notable firsts in the CIS; first state to privatise 
land, first to break with the rouble and establish its own currency (1993), first to join 
the World Trade Organisation (1998). Like Shevardnadze, had Akaev stepped down 
in 2000, he might have done so with a little gratitude and some applause but his 
decision to seek another term sealed his fate. By this stage, Akaev had engineered a 
series of constitutional changes that had augmented his powers and his family had 
greatly enriched themselves. Far from becoming the “Switzerland of Central Asia” as 
Akaev had once boasted, Kyrgyzstan had simply conformed to many of the excesses 
characteristic of other Central Asian executives breeding a corrupt elite parasitically 
living off an impoverished and politically impotent citizenry. Like Shevardnadze 
before him, Akaev had attracted substantial international acclamation and funding 
only to see both evaporate shortly after the 2000 presidential election as it became 
clear that the regime had become merely a corrupt oligarchy. Both the US and Russia 
had military bases in Kyrgyzstan but as Akaev felt increasingly under threat there was 
a noticeable shift towards Russia during his last year in office. The Kremlin, in turn, 
had learnt something from the Ukraine debacle and while keeping good relations with 
Akaev maintained contact with opposition leaders many of whom were not, like 
Saakashvili and Yushchenko, unabashedly pro-Western in orientation. 
As Kyrgyzstan became progressively weaker, its elites grew more rapacious in 
devouring the state’s remaining resources and more intolerant of dissent. The Kyrgyz 
opposition did however retain some of the residual structural advantages afforded to 
them in the 1990s though these were fast disappearing. An independent print media 
did continue to exist though it was largely confined to the capital, dependent on 
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foreign printing presses and subjected to continuous repression.52 Externally funded 
NGOs and other actors played a much smaller role in Kyrgyzstan than in Georgia and 
Ukraine though a much greater one than in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The 
opposition lacked, however, a television channel like Rustavi 2 in Georgia or Channel 
5 in Ukraine, to champion its cause. The public received its TV news exclusively 
from Kyrgyz state television and a small number of Russian channels, all of which 
portrayed the Rose and Orange Revolutions as lamentable descents into anarchy.53
Despite negative media coverage, the Rose and Orange Revolutions certainly 
had a strong demonstration effect on elites and society in Kyrgyzstan. In Bishkek, 
students had formed Kel-Kel, an imitation of Kmara and Pora, which tried to energise 
political participation on the part of the youth. In a clear attempt to emulate the 
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, a colour was chosen to emblematise the protest 
movement and a flower. It was perhaps symptomatic of the lack of unity combined 
with the artificial nature of the debate that it was never conclusively decided whether 
yellow or pink would symbolise the revolution though the tulip edged out the daffodil 
as the relevant flower, in large part due to Akaev’s use of the term “Tulip Revolution” 
on a number of occasions. 
The Tulip Revolution followed the Georgian/Ukrainian script with a Kyrgyz 
twist. The large crowds, though never reaching the levels witnessed in Kyiv and 
Tbilisi, were mainly to be found in peripheral towns and cities in the south and took 
the form of a popular uprising, temporarily displacing government officials and 
structures with “revolutionary” ones. Akaev went ahead and opened the new 
parliament on the 22 March, claiming that the worst was over and that he had found 
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an “antidote” to the colour revolution virus, only to find himself within days 
dislodged from the White House by an angry mob and on a plane to Moscow and 
political obscurity. Where the Tulip Revolution diverged from its Rose and Orange 
predecessors was that it introduced a level of violence into what had hitherto been an 
entirely peaceful enterprise. In an effort to avoid bloodshed, Akaev had refused to 
declare a state of emergency though it is not clear whether he could have relied 
entirely on the security apparatus. That said, it was defeat by superior numbers rather 
than defection by irresolute officers that explained how the police failed to protect the 
presidential palace and those Akaev aides unfortunate enough not to have fled the 
building were badly beaten. Unlike Shevardnadze or Kuchma the question of Akaev 
staying in the country after the revolution was off the table and Kyrgyzstan’s first 
president is condemned to a life in exile, thus raising the stakes for other post-soviet 
autocrats. Most importantly, perhaps, after the storming of the White House, Bishkek 
was convulsed in an orgy of violence and looting that left three dead and much of the 
commercial districts damaged. Foreign shops, particularly Turkish, were targeted and 
the process took on an unpleasant ethnic appearance as Russians and other minorities 
were intimidated.54 Whether one interprets this as anarchy engineered by pro-Akaev 
elements (as some opposition figures argued) or a collective venting of pent-up anger, 
it damaged the image of the revolution and indicated that a qualitatively different 
process was at play than that experienced in Georgia and Ukraine. 
Kyrgyzstan shared many of the structural conditions present in Georgia and 
Ukraine – an unpopular president on the verge of stepping down, electoral 
irregularities, a reasonably strong civil society complemented by opposition parties, 
some independent media outlets, and Western assistance. However, it lacked a strong 
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and united opposition. By the time Akaev had been toppled, many opposition leaders 
had united on paper, but the parties they maintained were small, and little united them 
save a common will to power and desire to see the back of Akaev. It would soon 
become evident that Kyrgyzstan’s opposition had leap-frogged to power despite a 
lack of preparation and having been denied some of the structural advantages enjoyed 
by their counterparts in Georgia and Ukraine. In the short-term, Western organisations 
basked in what seemed like another democratic success story and in July 2005, 
Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected president with 89% of the vote and promptly 
appointed Felix Kulov as prime minister in what was trumpeted as a north-south unity 
dream team. 
VIII. Tajikistan: no violet revolution
Parliamentary elections were held in Tajikistan at the same time as Kyrgyzstan but led 
to regime consolidation rather than collapse. President Rakhmonov, ruler of the 
Central Asian republic since 1992, presided over a weak state much like Akaev’s and 
there was a mild degree of political pluralism but autocracy, corruption and poverty 
were the main features of the regime. In June 2003 an omnibus national referendum, 
approved by 90% with a 96% turnout, had made fifty changes to the constitution, the 
most significant of which allowed Rakhmonov to rule until 2020.55 The strongest 
card that Rakhmonov has been able to play is the need for stability and peace to ward 
off the ever-present threat of war and chaos.56 Threats of civil war are not idle in 
Tajikistan; the country underwent a vicious internecine feud for five years in the 
1990s leaving an estimated 100,000 dead and half a million homeless. Fears of a 
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return to mass violence dampens enthusiasm for mass mobilization and strengthens 
government charges that rallies and protests are organized by reckless individuals, 
insensitive to the dangers of opposing the regime that has presided over peace, if not 
prosperity. 
Prior to the Tulip Revolution, the Tajik government had beefed up security 
along the border with Kyrgyzstan and Rakhmonov met with security chiefs as Akaev 
was dislodged from power.57 Cognisant of the decisive role the security forces had 
played in determining the success or failure of colour revolutions, Rakhmanov has 
granted generous pay rises for the police, army, and judicial apparatus on whose 
loyalty his rule depends.58 On 6 November 2006, Rakhmonov demolished his 
opponents taking almost 80% of the vote in a five man presidential contest. Three of 
the main opposition parties did not bother offering candidates, unwilling to lend 
legitimacy to a foregone conclusion. The opposition was hopelessly divided and 
unable to agree on a common strategy let alone nominate a consensus candidate to 
take on the president.59 In early 2007, a new movement, Vatandor (Patriot), was 
founded by Dodojon Atovulloev, chief editor of the Charogi Ruz newspaper that is 
smuggled into Tajikistan. The success of Atovulloev’s movement, according to its 
founder, will depend on the vast émigré vote, estimated to be in excess of one million 
Tajiks, most of them young males, who have fled the country and whose repatriations 
constitute more than 10% of Tajikistan’s GNP. Though Vatandor threatened to 
mobilise hundreds of thousands of people to inaugurate a ‘violet revolution’ if 
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Rakhmanov did not step down,60 his chances of success, and those of similar 
movements, are slim. Rakhmonov has provided his security ministries with sufficient 
inducements to guarantee their loyalty. More important perhaps is consistent, though 
conditional, support from Moscow. Russia was decisive in ending the civil war in 
Rakhmonov’s favour and is the key to maintaining the fragile peace. Should 
Rakhmonov rile the Kremlin his position would immediately be jeopardised but this is 
unlikely in the foreseeable future considering the mutual dependency that has 
developed. Moreover, the émigrés, in which the opposition has put much stead, are 
disparate and difficult to organize let alone mobilize. Finally, it is very difficult to 
disseminate any anti-regime message within Tajikistan. Opposition parties on the 
ground, disabled by media monopolies, state repression and popular apathy, are 
unable to do so and parties based abroad are similarly handicapped.
IX. Uzbekistan: blood on the streets
Uzbekistan had emerged as a key ally of the US in the ‘war on terror’ but Islam 
Karimov, former communist leader and president since independence, became 
increasingly alarmed by the colour revolution phenomena. In particular, Karimov 
could not understand how the United States could profess itself his friend while 
encouraging civil society and other political initiatives in Uzbekistan that could only 
undermine his monopoly of power. It did not escape Karimov’s attention that 
Shevardnadze and Akaev had been being darlings of the West, generously supported 
by substantial aid, and yet these men had been overthrown by forces assisted by 
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Western funded organizations. In a revealing interview with the Russian paper 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he explained his view of events:
Everything depends on the preparations. Take Ukraine, for example, where preparations 
for the recent election began in 1995. Consider how many non-governmental 
organizations exist there and on whose money do they exist, and everything will become 
instantly clear. By the way, we are tracking all funds and grants nowadays. We want to 
know what project exactly is under way so as to be able to tell truly humanitarian projects 
from veiled preparations for some "colour" revolution.61
Karimov had not been idle and after the Rose Revolution a concerted assault on 
Western-funded NGOs was initiated. In April 2004, the Soros Foundation in 
Uzbekistan, which only months previously enjoyed a status that endowed employees 
with diplomatic cards, was shut down on spurious technical grounds.62 The stream of 
closures became a flood after the Orange Revolution. Internews, Freedom House, 
Radio Free Europe and the BBC all felt the heat and their offices were shut down by 
order of the government. 
Elections to Uzbekistan’s powerless bi-cameral parliament took place on 26 
December 2004, the same day as Yushchenko’s triumph in Ukraine and Karimov was 
keen to clarify the difference of approach in the two countries. As he cast his vote, 
Karimov described Uzbekistan’s path as evolutionary not revolutionary. ‘Our way, 
the way of Uzbekistan is evolutional. I am strictly against revolution as revolution is 
violence’.63 The umbilical connection made between violence and revolution, 
echoing soviet reasoning, was repeated regularly by the Uzbek leader. He attributed 
the Orange Revolution to Kuchma’s ‘errors’ and ‘miscalculations’ that allowed a 
large ‘protest potential’ to accumulate in Ukraine which exploded at the elections.
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Karimov also believed that the Ukrainian ‘crisis’ was due to foreign interference. 
‘These newly created organisations like PORA, Kmara and Otpor, I believe, 
contradict all democratic principles we often like to cite’. He said that such 
organisations required large amounts of money and human capital and that ‘the 
international community should pay attention to these facts because the variants for 
possible defeat at the elections are ready’.64
After the Orange Revolution the wide thoroughfare in Tashkent’s Mustakillik 
(Independence) Square, where Independence Day celebrations and other official 
events are held, suddenly disappeared, replaced by narrow footpaths surrounded by 
trees as foliage replaced previously paved open spaces. At the end of April 2005, 
parks suddenly sprang up throughout the capital’s city centre, blocking access to 
government buildings. Karimov told state television viewers that the changes were 
simply due to routine urban improvements.65 Fear of large crowds mobilizing was at 
the heart of the Andijan massacre that took place in the densely populated Ferghana 
region on 13 May 2005. Independent estimates of how many died put the number at 
as many as seven hundred. The Uzbek authorities initially admitted to seven dead, 
before revising the figure to 169 in the face of widespread disbelief.66 Employing the 
traditional bogeyman of Islamic fundamentalism, that he had exploited to curry favour 
with America, Karimov blamed religious fanatics:
They hoped that weak local and central power would allow a Kyrgyz variant. Calling on 
youth with poisoned ideas, they counted on achieving their goals by seizing administration 
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buildings, overthrowing the authorities constitutionally chosen by the people, and creating a 
Muslim caliphate here.67
The euphoria that had accompanied the colour revolutions quickly subsided after the 
Andijan massacre. It was no longer simply a case of “election-protest-resignation-
victory”. Events in Uzbekistan also had the effect of taking some pressure off post-
soviet dictators some of whom had feared that the colour revolutions were an 
unstoppable tide that would overwhelm them. 
X. Kazakhstan: colourless elections 
Kazakhstan is in theory a multi-party democracy but in reality is ruled by one man, 
former communist boss Nursultan Nazarbayev. The first elections following the Rose 
Revolution, the 19 September and 3 October parliamentary elections saw opposition 
representation in the national legislature fall to a single seat.68 The Orange triumph 
was more difficult to explain away than the Rose Revolution since it was difficult to 
argue that Ukraine was more backward than Kazakhstan, as had been implied in the 
case of Georgia. The day after Victor Yushchenko won the presidential contest in 
Ukraine, the Kazakhstan administration filed a criminal case against the Soros 
Foundation for alleged tax evasion. Moreover, on 28 December 2004, Kazakhstan’s 
Prosecutor-General brought forward charges against the Democratic Choice of 
Kazakhstan (DCK), the most radical of the opposition parties69 and, on 6 January 
2005, an Almaty court obligingly ordered the organization to disband. The court 
accepted the Prosecutor-General’s argument that by claiming that recent 
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parliamentary elections had been “rigged” and the government “illegitimate”, DCK 
could be described as an “extremist” organization and its advocacy of non-violent 
resistance threatened social harmony and the security of the state.
As the Tulip Revolution unfolded in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, the Kazakhstani 
political elite was for a brief time in a state of shock. The border was closed and 
Almaty, a mere three hours drive from Bishkek, was awash with rumours as the 
government imposed an information blockade.70 Nazarbayev had linked himself 
closely with Akaev to the extent that his youngest daughter had married Akaev’s 
eldest son in a modern re-enacting of feudal marriage alliances.71 When it became 
clear that Akaev had absconded many suspected (correctly as it turned out) that he 
had taken refuge in Kazakhstan before making his way to Russia. Kazakh State 
television followed a highly negative report on the rioting with the presenter stating 
that ‘hardship and the weakness of the authorities’, (the implication being that neither 
affected Kazakhstan) were at the root of the disturbances. ‘Experts’ were brought on 
to parrot the line emanating from Moscow and Tashkent that the Kyrgyz events were 
modelled on political techniques devised elsewhere. A parliamentary deputy from the 
presidential party, Otan, was then trundled out to confirm the expert view:
We should assess the events in Georgia, Ukraine and Bishkek as a new political technique. 
It was not representatives of the ordinary people who took to the square. It was a small 
number of quite specific people. There were both followers of an idea and people who have 
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their own aims in view. There were also people who looted shops during the riots. 
However, this is a political technique.72
Nazarbayev quickly realised that the new regime in Bishkek, an amalgam of former 
Akaev ministers, would not threaten Kazakhstan and was the only foreign head of 
state to attend Kurmanbek Bakiev’s inauguration in July 2005. He knew also that 
Kyrgyzstan could not escape its geography, surrounded as it was by China, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, states that would not tolerate exporting revolution to 
their territories. The kind of pressure that could and would be applied was more 
directly articulated during the height of the disturbances by the Chairman of the 
Kazakh Union of Economists, who assured the viewing public that Kyrgyzstan’s 
flirtation with revolution would quickly be contained as the would-be radicals 
digested economic and geopolitical realities:
It is not in their interest to worsen economic relations with Kazakhstan. This applies to 
[their relations with] Russia and Uzbekistan. All these markets are our markets. On the 
other hand, this will not damage our entrepreneurs’ activities there because no one is 
investing in Kyrgyzstan except us and Russia. They know this perfectly well.73
The following December, Nazarbayev was elected for another seven year term. 
Having marginalized any potential source of opposition long before the election was 
announced, Nazarbayev ensured that the campaign was ‘colourless’ both in process 
and result.74 During the campaign television viewers were assailed with images of 
rioting and looting in Bishkek and stories of how Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan 
had deteriorated since their respective regime changes.75 This also became an 
essential part of the Kremlin mythology. Buoyed by huge reservoirs of oil and
committed to a multi-vector foreign policy that seeks alliances with all major powers, 
                                               
72 Kazakhstan TV1 [in Kazakh], 25 March 2005. The Otan MP interviewed was Serik Abdirakhmanov. 
73 Kazakhstan TV1 [in Kazakh], 25 March 2005. Interview with Arystan Yesentugelov. 
74 Kennedy, A Colorless Election. In: Problems of Post Communism, 53 (2006) 6, pp. 46-58. 
45
Nazarbayev’s position is relatively secure. He also knows from experience that 
Western commitments to democracy can often be bartered with. Just months after 
unfair parliamentary elections eliminated the last vestige of opposition and created a 
one-party legislature, Kazakhstan was rewarded with the chairmanship of the OSCE 
in 2010.76
XI. Turkmenistan: Stalin’s Disneyland unscathed 
The colour revolutions on Turkmenistan had a negligible effect on the hermit state of 
Turkmenistan. No reference was made to the revolutions on Turkmen state television 
though negative reports from Russian television were available to the large amount of 
satellite TV subscribers.77 As a one party state with a president for life, the Turkmen 
regime had zero tolerance for any manifestation of opposition. A small opposition in 
exile, composed mainly of former political notables, has been unable to make any 
headway and an attempted assassination of Niyazov in November 2002 merely 
provided a new basis for repression.78
Turkmenistan has nothing to fear from the new ‘revolutionary’ governments in 
Georgia and Ukraine as both countries, particularly Ukraine, depend on Central Asian 
energy supplies. As they sought to wrestle free from Russian domination, Presidents 
Saakashvili and Yushchenko found themselves making strategic economic alliances 
with the Turkmen dictator. These alliances were reaffirmed when Sapamurat Niyazov 
died in December 2006; both Saakashvili and Yushchenko attended the funeral in 
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Ashgabat, paying due homage with a view to pleasing the emerging elite led by 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. Initial optimism that the new Turkmen leader would 
undo the worst excesses of the Niyazov regime and perhaps even liberalise the polity 
has proved largely unfounded. The opening of Ashgabat’s first internet café in 2007 
was hailed as a major step forward but even this “reform” was illusionary.79 In sum, 
Turkmenistan presents few of the conditions necessary for a colour revolution; it has 
no independent media and no legal opposition within the country. Energy riches 
insulate the country from foreign influence and the activities of civil society are 
emasculated. 
XII. Azerbaijan: necktie revolutionaries
The threat of revolution was stronger in oil rich Azerbaijan where unrealised 
expectations of instant wealth from the country’s huge Caspian Sea reserves had 
disillusioned many ordinary people. As a Muslim member of George W. Bush’s 
“coalition of the willing” with troops in Iraq, Azerbaijan had enhanced its clout in 
Washington since 911.80 Azerbaijan was also the source of energy for the only 
pipeline that could deliver Caspian Sea energy to the European market without going 
through Russia or Iran. The construction of this Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2002 
further boosted Azerbaijan’s prominence in US foreign policy. Not only was America 
unlikely to offer more than mild criticism of the Azerbaijan regime but Mikheil 
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Saakashvili had made it clear from the beginning that he did not intend to disturb the 
domestic political arrangements of  his Caucasian neighbour. If Georgia was to 
confront Russia on the issue of energy it meant finding alternative sources of oil and 
gas. This in turn made cosying up to dictators not only in Azerbaijan but in 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan absolutely necessary. 
When Shevardnadze was overthrown, Ilham Aliev’s position as President of 
Azerbaijan and leader of the governing New Azerbaijan (Yeni Azerbaycan) party was 
shaky. He had come to power as part of a dynastic succession thinly disguised as a 
democratic election on 15 October 2003. His father, Heydar, had ruled Azerbaijan for 
a decade and would have contested again had his health not begun to fail him as he 
approached his eightieth birthday. Ilham was put forward as the governing party’s 
sole candidate for the presidential election and according to official results, generally 
dismissed as fiction by international monitors, he took 77% of the vote in the first 
round.81
All major opposition parties condemned the fraudulent elections and though 
official permission to rally was refused protests went ahead regardless attracting up to 
ten thousand demonstrators. Violent clashes with police resulted in a couple of 
fatalities and over six hundred imprisoned. The opposition were temporarily silenced 
but got renewed impetus from the Rose and Orange revolutions. A plethora of youth 
movements modelled on Kmara and PORA emerged including Yeni Fikir (New 
Thought) linked to the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, Magam (It’s Time) and YOX 
(No!). Contact was made with Kel Kel in Kyrgyzstan and hopes were high that 
Azerbaijan’s parliamentary elections in November 2005 – the first such elections 
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since the Tulip Revolution – might be the scene for what was already being dubbed 
the ‘necktie revolution’.82
The Azeri Government took pre-emptive measures before the November 2005 
elections. During the summer of 2005, the government launched a campaign against 
the youth movements that had sprung up in Azerbaijan, openly imitating the symbols 
and tactics of their Georgian, Serbian and Ukrainian counterparts.83 Throughout the 
autumn, the Aliev regime remained hyper-sensitive to all potential threats. On 15 
September, PORA leader Sergei Yevtushenko was detained at Baku airport and put 
on a plane to Donetsk. Yevtushenko, a former adviser to Ukraine’s foreign minister, 
had been invited by Musavat leader, Isa Gambar to visit Azerbaijan and address 
members of his organization.84 The leader of MAGAM, , Emin Huseynov, co-
operated with Kmara and the Liberty Institute in Georgia.Huseynov travelled to 
Tbilisi fifty days before the vote to get advice from Liberty Institute Director Levan 
Ramishvili and others.85 The Azadliq (Freedom) bloc ostentatiously imitated the 
Ukraine model, adopting orange as their colour for flags and symbols. They copied 
the Georgian revolutionary emblem by adopting a red carnation and OTPOR/Kmara 
influence was evident in the widespread use of the clenched fist as a symbol of 
resistance. Leaflets were printed on orange paper; graffiti was in the Azeri language 
with orange paint. Ramil Gassanov, a leader of the governing party’s youth wing, 
mocked this aspect. ‘Look, they have chosen orange as their colour, their symbol, the 
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colour they have chosen is foreign, imported from Ukraine, its shows they lack 
initiative, lack originality’.86 For his part, President Aliev dismissed the possibility of 
a colour revolution: ‘when we see these Orange t-shirts, we can only laugh at 
them’.87 He had some reason to smile since the international funds made available to 
youth movement in Georgia (half a million from Soros) and Serbia (several million 
from the US) did not find its way to Azeri youth movements. Moreover, the Georgian 
and Ukrainian governments studiously avoided any hint of supporting the Azeri 
opposition.88
Thwarted in their efforts to stage mass rallies, the opposition received an enormous 
boost by the announcement that Rasul Guliyev, a former speaker of parliament and 
one of the leaders of the ‘democratic opposition,’ was returning to Azerbaijan after a 
decade of self-imposed exile. Fifty thousand people were expected to greet him on his 
arrival at Baku’s Heyder Aliev International Airport so Aliev Junior acted swiftly. 
Over a hundred opposition leaders were arrested, several thousands troops were 
placed at the airport, and it was made clear that should Guliyev set foot in Azerbaijan 
he would be arrested and enjoy the tender mercies of Azeri justice. A stop in Ukraine 
gave Guliyev enough time to figure that his return to Baku would more likely end in 
prison than parliament and he returned to London.89
Guliyev’s retreat slowed vital opposition momentum but it soon became clear 
that Aliev was just starting. Having demonstrated to the opposition that he would 
tolerate no mobilization, he quickly began to crush potential rivals closer to his power 
base.  Inheriting the presidency at short notice from his father, Ilham Aliev had taken 
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time to acclimatise to his new role. An ex-KGB and Communist Party boss Heydar 
Aliev had built up a formidable power base and had cemented allegiances from 
influential Azeri clans. Ilham’s relative youth and inexperience made him a softer 
touch and power began to accumulate in the hands of ministers to the extent that some 
felt untouchable enough to publicly criticise government policies. It seems at this 
point that Aliev sought help from Moscow using the old KGB network of which 
Russian President Vladimir Putin had been a part. In October, many high ranking 
state officials were charged and arrested with plotting a coup with the opposition. In 
the space of two weeks dozens of former cabinet ministers, government officials, 
police chiefs, and business executives were arrested and taken out of circulation. On 1 
November, the Prosecutor-General’s Office and Ministries of the Interior and 
National Security released a joint statement claiming that they had evidence proving 
that those arrested had been plotting with Guliyev to overthrow Aliev ahead of the 
parliamentary elections. Prepared confessions were read out by the accused on 
national television (AzTV). Any lingering notions that Aliev was a wimp, a shadow 
of his iron-willed father, were by now firmly put to bed. On 4 November, he publicly 
warned his cabinet to take note of his recent purge that had saved the country from 
anarchy and civil war. Almost simultaneously, 10,000 supporters of his Yeni 
Azerbaijan Party rallied in Baku Square waving portraits of the president and his 
father. No difficulties were encountered in securing permission for the rally. By the 
time the parliamentary elections were held on 6 November, almost all opposition had 
been silenced and the president’s supporters romped to victory amid widespread 
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charges of voting irregularities. A colour revolution had been averted but not without 
a considerable effort by President Aliev.90
XIII. Belarus: the bison awakens
Belarus is perhaps the country that has most constantly tried to produce a revolution. 
Since 2001 civil society has been active in organizing street protests like the “We 
can’t live like this” march on 12 April 2002 against what the US administration has 
called “the last dictatorship in Europe”. Belarus is also a prime example of how the 
attitude of the incumbent regime is important in determining the outcome of a colour 
revolution. 
Since his election in 1994, Aleksander Lukashenka has completely changed 
the political direction of the country, transforming a state that was slowly carrying out 
market reforms and timidly orientating itself westwards into a continuation of the 
Soviet Union and one of the best allies of Russia.91 From an economic point of view 
Belarus is doing well, partially thanks to favourable prices of Russian raw materials it 
enjoys.92 The political regime has more in common with a Central Asian state than a 
European one93 and Belarus conforms in some ways to Linz and Stepan’s description 
of a Sultanistic regime.94 Media censorship is more pronounced than during the 
Glasnost years, NGOs are given little opportunity for political action and opposition 
leaders are closely monitored. Anti government leaflets and magazines are normally 
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printed in Russia and then smuggled into Belarus. Despite all this, the NGO sector, 
and civil society in general, is one of the most active in the CIS. Reports abound of 
arrested NGO leaders accused of terrorism,95 and NGOs closed96 or heavily taxed. 
Authorisation for demonstrations must be sought fifteen days in advance and these 
often end with arrests and violence. However since 2002 open air protests have been 
organized when possible and were attempted during the 2003 parliamentary elections, 
the 2004 referendum and the 2006 presidential elections. In fact among the biggest 
protests of a “failed revolution” have occurred in Minsk, with more than 10,000 
people gathering in the  city centre to protest against Lukashenka’s victory in the 2006 
presidential elections, all the more significant when we consider the risks they face in 
confronting the authorities.97
Ordinary people and civil society could not alone guarantee the radical change 
witnessed in other countries. Both the Belarusian population and civil society are not 
as much against the regime as is reported in the West.  Though Western observers 
ridiculed the 2006 elections in which Lukashenka won 82% of the vote as being 
neither free nor fair independent surveys conducted before the elections still gave 
Lukashenka a strong lead over his opponents.98 Moreover, the opposition had been 
unable to unite; at the elections they failed to present a joint candidate though fighting 
for the same electorate.99 The West had little room for manoeuvre in Belarus. So 
many sanctions had been implemented against the country (it was excluded from the 
Council of Europe in 1997) that there was not much that the EU or the USA can still 
use as a stick. The Lukashenka regime meanwhile continues a subtle policy of 
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harassment and repression. During the 2006 protests, the strategy was to arrest the 
leaders of the protests one by one and then attack the mass with the police. This was 
much more subtle than the techniques used in Uzbekistan 2005 or Myanmar in 2007, 
as no mass killing were reported and thus the events gained comparatively little 
international attention. Nevertheless such policies have had a sobering effect on 
would-be opposition activists who know that the price of political agitation might be a 
long prison term.
XIV. Conclusion
The colour revolution phenomenon has the appearance of a chess match between 
regimes and opposition in the CIS. Whilst the opposition has been perfecting its 
techniques to “organize a revolution”, the regimes have also had to undergo a steep 
learning curve the better to formulate effect counter-strategies. In particular, post-
soviet autocracies have absorbed several lessons from the colour revolutions. They 
could be summarised as follows:
Don’t allow youth organisations to develop.
Be wary of Western funded organisations.
Divide the opposition.
Ensure your own forces are united.
Ensure security forces are on side.
Do not allow large gatherings of protesters, particularly close to official 
buildings.
                                                                                                                                      
99 Second place Aleksander Milinkievich took 6% of preferences, Sergey Gaidukevich 3.5% 
Aleksandar Kazulin 2% making a total of 11.5% won by the opposition. 
54
One tactic frequently employed by the ruling authorities has been the use of 
“clones”, that is organizations established by the government that mimic in 
appearance existing opposition movements and are designed to confuse the public by 
parroting a pro-government agenda. This was a common practice during the Soviet 
era but in the wake of the colour-revolutions it has regained popularity among post-
soviet elites. Kyrgyzstan’s Kel-Kel is a case in point. Within days of being established 
as an anti-Akaev youth organization, another youth group sprang up with the same 
name but a very different message for which they were given the original Kel Kel’s 
website domain to propagate.100 In the Azerbaijan of 2006, there were two “Islamic” 
parties, two “Civic Unity”, three “Popular Fronts”, four “Democratic” parties and no 
less than five “Communist” parties. The clones, often formed from renegade members 
of the original party, are quickly registered by the government and play the role of 
pseudo-opposition, sometimes under direct government control, to sow confusion and 
encourage membership leakage from the real opposition groups.101
Harsh attitudes and iron fists are certainly an asset for current regimes. Post-
soviet governments in Central Asia have generally relied on traditional conservatism 
and a widespread deference to authority and elders, all of which are presented as 
national virtues. Opposition (as would be displayed in, say, a presidential debate) is 
equated with division and confrontation and is portrayed as foreign to the national 
character. Family pressures – parental, spousal or other – also play a major role in 
political socialisation. In such societies, where family and community are so 
important, not only does political activity mean possible alienation from both but also 
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the authorities make clear that anti-state activities will involve repercussions not only 
in terms of one’s personal career and security but also for those  of family members. 
Another point is that people in some cases are too poor to be content but too 
cowed to mobilise. When worried about earning their daily bread people have no time 
or will to involve themselves in protest movements, unless a dramatic event happens 
and their economic situation further deteriorates. Ultimately, mobilisation mainly 
involves those strata that are not so poor to be preoccupied with issues of survival but 
not so rich that they are unwilling to risk what they have. When rallies are banned and 
there is a consequent risk of physical abuse only a small hardcore of agitators will 
mobilize, making them easier to identify, isolate and monitor. Their arrests mean yet 
smaller gatherings next time creating a diminishing cycle that will only be broken by 
a mass uprising as was seen in Andijan with tragic consequences.
In most post-soviet countries the opposition have failed to mobilize people to 
the levels necessary to seriously undermine the government. There was often a 
credibility gap; on the one hand the opposition would claim that the vast majority of 
the electorate was with them while they found it difficult to muster regularly more 
than 10,000 people to defend their position on the streets. Opposition alliances, so 
vital to create the conditions necessary for mass mobilization, are often fragile and 
vulnerable to external pressure or internal dissention. This is especially true when the 
opposition is elite in exile rather than a genuine alternative with opposition leaders 
having far more in common with the ruling regime than with the common people. But 
since the government monopolises coercive power, the opposition have no option but 
to fall back on the people, or certainly this was a lesson learnt from Georgia and 
Ukraine. The people will, according to this view, be the vehicle to drive the 
opposition to power. Usually ignored between elections, the people are to be courted 
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into the streets to act as the battering ram against the gates of power. But like 
marriage in a Hollywood fairytale it is unclear what happens afterwards. Whereas 
there is a temptation to view those leaders ranked against the existing autocratic 
government as purveyors of liberal and democratic values, this is often not the case. 
Opposition figures often have only a negative identity with little uniting them bar a 
collective will to dislodge the president. Lacking policies and unable to unite behind a 
common platform they seem sometimes to offer a change of personalities not of 
policies. Theirs is a struggle more for power than for democracy or social justice -
more person change than regime change.
The ‘revolutionary’ states have been unwilling or unable to export their model 
to most other post soviet countries on whom they depend for trade. For much the 
same reason, Western countries have been reluctant to support civil society or 
political party development to the point where it jeopardises their energy supplies. 
Toleration for gas rich Turkmenistan and oil rich Kazakhstan can be contrasted with 
the international isolation of energy poor Belarus. Thus, revolutionary impulses must 
be indigenous. External forces can facilitate, they can sometimes support, but they 
cannot manufacture a revolution.
Western observers regularly berate, increasingly functionally, post soviet 
states for electoral fraud and for missing the opportunity to win the confidence of 
European public opinion, not realising perhaps that the objective is to win domestic 
power not Western flattery. But as elections provided the catalyst for the Rose, 
Orange and Tulip Revolutions, Russia and other post-soviet autocracies have sought 
to counteract the critical findings of the OSCE’s election monitoring organization 
ODIHR (appropriately pronounced ‘oh dear’), whose damning reports were seized 
upon by oppositions to justify their position. To this end CIS election missions, 
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composed of observers selected by post-soviet autocracies, have been dispatched to 
counteract ODIHR and other Western or independent election monitors. The CIS 
missions invariably give a clean bill of health and ignore even the most outrageous 
excesses of electoral manipulation. When Karimov was elected Uzbek President for 
another seven year term on 25 December 2007 in a rigged contest, the CIS described 
the contest as ‘free, open and transparent’ and said it had received no complaints.102
A similar endorsement was received the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a 
Russian-Chinese dominated organization that includes all post-soviet Central Asian 
states except Turkmenistan.103
Although the phenomenon of colour revolutions has not ended yet, two 
aspects should be highlighted. The first is the extent to which both post-soviet leaders 
and oppositions have learnt from these events. Rather than see the regime-changes as 
the result of autocratic deficiencies, there has been a tendency to attribute events to 
“political technologies” devised in the West and skilfully executed in a manner that 
camouflage its foreign roots. Oppositions, for their part, have demonstrable proof that 
mass mobilisation timed to coincide with a rigged election can sometimes dislodge 
unpopular autocrats. Secondly, non-violent protest movements have been a leitmotif 
of political protests in recent years. Although there is no conclusive evidence that 
what has happened in Rangoon, Kathmandu, Kuala Lumpur or Lhasa is directly 
connected with colour revolutions in the CIS, the intensity and regularity of the 
protests seem to confirm that a tendency to use civil disobedience is growing, 
although governments seem to have found effective ways to minimize their effects.
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